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Abstract 
 Throughout human history, havoc has been wrought by just a handful 
of very powerful leaders.  The ultimate catastrophe could also be caused by 
just a few individuals, by unleashing a nuclear war or by ignoring 
international agreements on climate change.  Donald Trump, for example, 
may renege on the Paris Agreement and commit other ecological blunders, 
which could spell the end for everyone.  In a nutshell, the current democratic 
process gives him far too much power. 
The rights of any one citizen or country must be tempered by the rights of 
all.  Alas, current forms of decision-making often fail to involve everyone in 
the final decision, the most obvious instances relating to decisions taken by a 
(simple or weighted) majority vote.  If instead decision-making were based 
on the local, national or international consensus, such exclusive decisions 
could not be taken so easily.  It should also be pointed out that 
majoritarianism – majority rule based on majority voting – has been and still 
is problematic in numerous inter-communal conflicts. 
This paper therefore outlines the flaws involved in binary voting; next, as a 
better methodology, it proposes a more inclusive voting mechanism; and 
finally, it advocates a structure to ensure that agreements are implemented, 
with possible penalties for those individuals, organisations or countries that 
flaunt the international consensus.   
 
Keywords: Consensus voting Modified Borda Count, MBC Matrix Vote 
 
“In a plural society the approach to politics as a zero-sum game is immoral 
and impracticable. Words like ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ have to be banished 
from the political vocabulary of a plural society.” 
(Lewis 1965: 66-7.) 
 
Introduction 
 An old African proverb notes that when elephants fight, ants get 
killed.  In like manner, the most powerful human beings often inflict fatal 
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blows on the poor and powerless.  Furthermore, as the years go by, man-
made disasters cause ever larger numbers of fatalities.  In a finite world, 
nothing can continue on an exponential curve for ever; unless truncated by a 
catastrophe, many developments follow either a hysteresis-style trajectory or 
a sort of normal distribution curve unto their own demise.  With advances in 
science, the world is now rapidly approaching two denouements: with fission 
and now fusion nuclear bombs, human beings could easily start a war which 
would lead to the end of all life on the planet; albeit rather more slowly, 
increases in CO2 emissions caused by human activity might have the same 
consequence. 
 As our species has evolved, many primitive tools have been replaced 
by gadgets of fantastic sophistication.  There is, however, one glaring 
exception: people continue to make decisions by means of a 2,500-year-old 
methodology, the most primitive, divisive and inaccurate measure of 
collective opinion ever invented: the (simple or weighted) majority vote.  
This binary voting has been part of the problem (a) in many dysfunctional 
administrations, as in the US if and when a Democrat president, say, is 
confronted by a Republican Congress; (b) in many international gatherings, 
if and when even a tiny minority vetoes potential decisions; (c) in an 
increasing number of binary referendums, like brexit and the Italian poll of 
Matteo Renzi, where the power of ‘no’ could oppose everything; and (d) in 
countless conflicts not only in Europe, in the Basque region, Northern 
Ireland, the Balkans and now Ukraine; but also in Africa, in Rwanda and 
Kenya for example; and throughout the Middle East where so many conflicts 
are based on Sunni/Shia minorities fighting Shia/Sunni majorities.  Despite 
these horrors, majority voting and its consequence, majority rule, continue to 
be upheld and practiced as if beyond criticism.  Granted, there are 
exceptions; many gatherings operate in what is described as consensus – and 
in using this term, those concerned usually mean a verbal consensus – not 
least because of the impracticalities of majority voting in any international 
forum.  Alas, all too few persons are aware of ‘consensus voting’ (section 
5).8 
 Alternatives to binary voting are many.  Some of these procedures are 
more accurate and, ergo, more democratic.  Furthermore, a few are non-
majoritarian.  If one of the latter were to be adopted as the democratic norm, 
there would be no further justification for majority rule.  Instead, as 
advocated for nearly every conflict zone, power could be shared.  Thus no 
one individual – Trump, Mugabe, al-Assad or whosoever – would be able to 
                                                          
8  The term applies to three voting methodologies, all of which are non-majoritarian 
and all of which are discussed later in this article. 
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impose his will, (it is usually a ‘he’), just because he has been elected by a 
(supposed) majority. 
 Accordingly, with a little historical background, this paper first 
reviews some of the mistakes, both political and mathematical, which have 
resulted from the almost ubiquitous belief in majoritarianism.  Next, it 
analyses some other decision-making methodologies.  Then it outlines the 
potential of a non-majoritarian procedure at the level of national governance 
and in international forums.  And finally, it suggests a proviso to help ensure 
international agreements on nuclear disarmament and global warming could 
be made binding.   
 
I. 
The political flaws of majoritarianism 
 Majority voting was first used in Ancient Greece, albeit just by the 
rich males, and in the Imperial Court of the Former Han Dynasty in China, 
but only by the appointed Ministers (Wang 1968: 176). But there was 
“nothing resembling a ‘party system’ in sixth/fifth-century Athens” (Ste 
Croix 2005: 198), so the polity could best be described, not as ‘the right of 
the majority to rule’ but as the right ‘of a majority’.  In this democratic 
structure, someone could vote with a colleague on one day, and against on 
another, without necessarily falling into blocs of permanent antipathy. 
 Voting was also used in Rome, where Pliny the Younger realised that 
in any debate on three or more options, binary voting was inadequate, so he 
advocated plurality voting.  Other decision-making structures were devised 
elsewhere in the world but most of these – the baraza, gacaca or palabré9 of 
sub-Saharan African, for example – relied on a verbal consensus.  Only in 
Europe did voting become the norm.   
 In 1299, the Catalan Ramon Llull suggested what is now called the 
Condorcet rule, and maybe too the Borda count, BC (McLean and Urken, 
1995: 16), though the history is a bit vague on this point.  One Cardinal 
Nicholas Cusanus definitely suggested the BC in 1435, but that too didn’t get 
very far (Sigmund 1963: 212); after all, the powerful don’t like decision-
making procedures which they can’t control.  As a consequence, majority 
voting and its consequence majority rule have predominated and, as shall 
now be related, this majoritarianism has wreaked havoc amongst millions.   
 
England 
 The House of Commons is designed for gladiatorial debate.  Initially, 
as in Greece of old, there were no political parties.  But one side faced the 
other, and decisions were taken by majority vote.  It did not take long, 
                                                          
9  Quoting the Kiswahili, Kinyawanda and French words respectively. 
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therefore, before abuse was being hurled across the floor.  “You tories,” 
shouted one side, “you Irish Papist bandits!” – a serious insult in those days.  
The response was equally rude: “You whigs!” – “money-grabbing Scots 
Presbyterians.”  (Churchill 1956: Book II, 294.)  Hence the current UK two-
party political system.  And hence, inter alia, Brexit. 
 
France 
 In 18th Century France, members of l’Académie des Sciences 
wondered how best to replace l’ancient régime.  They looked at Westminster 
but concluded, Mon Dieu, c’est incroyable.  After all, you cannot get la 
volonté général in a vote which is binary, for the outcome of such a ballot 
will invariably be to on one side or the other in the normal distribution curve, 
the left-wing or the right, whereas any consensus would be at its peak. 
 So maybe multi-option voting would be better.  Le Marquis de 
Condorcet advocated a pairings system, while Jean-Charles de Borda opted 
for points.  The problem of finding the most popular of many policies can be 
compared to a sports competition.  Consider a tournament (debate) in which 
there are seven teams (policies).  In a knock-out competition (binary voting), 
as in tennis but without any seeding, the resulting social choice might be 
accurate but the social ranking would be highly questionable.  Better, then, 
either a league system (Condorcet pairings) or one based on goals scored (BC 
points).  Every team plays every other team, (the voters cast their 
preferences), and then, in Condorcet, team (option) A plays (is compared 
with) B, then with C, etc., to see which team (option) wins the most matches 
(pairings).  In contrast, in a BC (preferences are translated into points), the 
goals (points) scored are counted, and the team (option) with the most goals 
(points) is the winner.  Both of the latter systems are pretty good – after all, 
the winner of the league often has the best goal difference – but in 1784 they 
chose the BC, mainly as an electoral system, and it worked pretty well. 
 A few years later, l’Académie, now renamed l’Institut Français, had 
a new president.  He didn’t like this preference voting so he, not best known 
for his democratic idealism, reverted to majority voting.  “The new member 
was Napoleon Bonaparte” (Black 1987: 180), later elected as the emperor by 
a majority vote in 1804; he won by 99.7 per cent (Emerson 2012: 144).  And 
this is just the first of umpteen majoritarian tragedies. 
 
The United States 
 Many of the founding fathers were bitterly opposed to the two-party 
political structure of Old Europe.  To quote George Washington in his 
farewell address of 1796, it was “a frightful despotism”.   Sadly, while they 
devised some pretty good electoral rules – Thomas Jefferson, for instance, 
invented a formula for PR (McLean and Urken, 1998: 44) – they did not 
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examine decision-making.  Decisions were taken by majority vote, so it did 
not take long before the two party system and party political patronage 
entered into US politics; hence today’s “frightful despotism,” possibly the 
worst two-party system in the world, has now produced the frightful Trump. 
 
The Soviet Union 
 Like many other monarchs, the Russian tzars were not too fond of 
democracy, and certainly not of the left-wing politicians in the All-Russia 
Congress of Social Democrats.  Like many other political parties, the 
Congress in London in 1903 used majority voting.  And like many another, it 
split into two wings, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ (just like today’s brexiteers –  section 
2.11), the former led by Julius Martov, the latter by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.  
The first vote went to the ‘soft’ wing, 28 to 23.  Oh don’t worry comrades, 
said Lenin, “I don’t think our differences are so important.”  In the next vote, 
after some had walked out, Lenin won, just: 19 to 17 with 3 abstentions, so 
he now had not a majority, just the largest minority.  (Deutscher 1966: 71.) 
 Ah but this was important, he decided.  The Congress split.  Lenin 
pretended he had the majority, bolshinstvo, and called his side the 
Bolsheviks.  While those of the minority, menshinstvo, became the 
Mensheviks.  In the post-revolution elections of 1917, the Bolsheviks won 
only 175 seats to the Social Revolutionaries who gained an absolute majority 
in the 707-seat Constituent Assembly of 370 seats.  At its first sitting, the 
‘hard’ man sent in the troops (Shub 1966: 315), so Lenin enjoyed his second 
coup d’état.  And the bolshevism of majoritarianism became the bolshevism 
of the gulags. 
 When Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and announced a policy of 
perestroika, many western experts rushed over to Moscow to tell him of the 
advantages of a free democracy.  Hold ‘free and fair’ elections, they advised 
him; establish a parliament (Duma); propose legislation; and implement any 
policy adopted in that parliament by a majority vote.  The word, in English, 
is majoritarianism.  But he doesn’t speak English, so of course they had to 
translate everything into Russian.  Mikhail Sergeyevich, they began, Vam 
nuzhen, you need… plus the Russian word for majoritarianism, Vam nuzhen 
bolshevism.  (A new word has now been coined, majoritarnost.)  Hence 
today’s ‘democratic bolshevik’, Vladimir Putin. 
 
China 
 Initially, the Communist Party of China “debated and voted” issues 
quite frequently, but Máo Zédōng “loathed the convention of voting… and 
abolished the practice.”  (Chang and Halliday, 2006: 81 and 90.)  
Nevertheless, a majoritarian thought process dominated his actions and his 
arguments.  “In 1959-60, some 3.6 million party members were labeled or 
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purged as rightists” (Dikötter 2011:102), and four years later, Máo addressed 
the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee: “we 
must win over the majority, oppose and smash the minority” (Schram 1969: 
325).  Thus it was on the ground; at a meeting in the County of Daoxian in 
Hunan Province, “participants voted to decide who would be killed; one by 
one, potential victims’ names were read and votes were tallied.  The process 
lasted for hours.”  (Yang 2011: 65.)   
 
The Balkans  
 In 1991, the EU’s “insistence on referendums… provided the 
impetus… to create ethnically pure areas through population transfers and 
expulsions as a prelude to a vote.”  (Woodward 1995: 271.)  And “all the 
wars in the former Yugoslavia started with a [majority vote] referendum.”  
(Oslobodjenje, Sarajevo’s now legendary newspaper, 7.2.1999.) 
 
Rwanda 
 The Interahamwe launched their 1994 genocide with the slogan, 
“Rubanda Nyamwinshi”, we are “the majority people”.  (Prunier 1995: 183.) 
 
Ukraine 
 Ukraine received its independence in 1991, at which time the EU 
argued for majority rule.  In 2014, however, when violence broke out on the 
barricades in Kiev, the EU changed its mind and advocated power-sharing.  
On 20th February, the President, Viktor Yanukovich agreed that a “new 
government of ‘national unity’ should be formed within 10 days” (The 
Guardian, 21.2.2014), but later that day, he went into exile.  The referendum 
in Crimea followed in March, with two more in Donetsk and Luhansk; 
majority votes, of course; and then, as in Bosnia, war, again of course.  
(Emerson 2016: 58.) 
 
The Middle East 
 For as long as people believe in majority rule, (a) there will not be a 
‘one-state’ solution to the Israel/Palestine problem; (b), Israel’s Arab Party, 
Joint List, will probably not be accepted into a coalition government; (c) in 
numerous countries from Bahrain to Yemen, arguments will rage between 
the Sunni/Shia majority and its supposed opposite minority – as in Northern 
Ireland, so too in all of these conflicts, majority rule is part of the problem; 
and (d) if the policy of ‘self-determination by majority vote referendum’ is 
implemented in Kirkuk and Mosul, etc., Iraq may well collapse with yet 
more violence, just like the Balkans.   
 
Kashmir and so on 
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 According to UN Resolution 47 of 1948, Kashmir should hold a 
referendum; if it did, in all probability, there would be bloodshed.  One 
consequence of South Sudan’s referendum in 2011 is that it has since 
imploded; a second is that other countries on the continent may also split on 
religious and/or tribal lines, like the Central African Republic, the Ivory 
Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo, with more horrific 
consequences.  Thirdly, there is talk of referendums in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, with little recognition of the fact that the repercussions in Xīnjiāng 
and Tibet could be terrible.   
 Despite all of the above tragedies, majoritarianism continues to 
dominate both the domestic and the international agenda, even when it does 
not work. 
 
Brexit 
 The late Jo Cox, MP, would probably still be alive if the Brexit ballot 
had been multi-optional.  The debate concerned whether the UK would 
remain in the EU, or be like Norway in the EEA, or have a looser arrangement 
as does Switzerland, or be in the Customs Union like Turkey, or whatever.  
The debate, however, was binary: “yes or no?” “remain or leave?”  The will 
of the people?  No no, everyone now knows what a 52 per cent majority does 
not want.  So everything has moved on to another binary debate, is Brexit to 
be ‘soft’ or ‘hard’, (see section 2.4). 
 
Italy 
 The 2016 referendum related to a choice of (i) the old constitutional 
arrangements or (ii) some new ones.  But the question asked was “(ii), yes or 
no?”  So those who favoured (i) voted ‘no’.  But those who did not support 
the EU, or Matteo Renzi, or the Democratic Party or je ne sais quoi also 
voted ‘no’.  So ‘no’ won.  This ‘yes-or-no’ voting might yet spread to other 
countries in the EU, saying ‘no’ to everything, until, according to the logic of 
populism, there is nothing. 
 
Trump  
 The US Presidential election was another (almost) binary contest, a 
double FPTP election in which there were just two favourites.  As in any FPTP 
ballot, therefore, some voters, not only supporters of Cruz and Sanders, for 
example, but those who might have wanted to vote for, say, Johnson or 
Stein, had to vote tactically.  Few, then, can have confidence in the outcome, 
48.08 per cent to Clinton to 46.00 to Trump, let alone the even more screwed 
results in the Electoral College, 232 to 306.10  So Trump has ‘won’; a 
                                                          
10  Figures as of 12.12.2016. 
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climate-change denier with less than 50 per cent of the vote now has 100 per 
cent of the power.   
 In a nutshell, he has inherited a political structure similar to or even 
worse than the UK’s “elected dictatorship” (Hailsham 1978: the phrase is 
used frequently).  The winner wins everything, the loser, even if on 49 per 
cent (or more!) gets nothing.  That’s what happens with majority rule.  In 
countless inter-communal conflicts around the world, and now, with the rise 
of populism in the States and in Europe, majoritarianism is a cause of 
conflict; in the latter setting, it is a threat to the very survival of our species.  
This form of decision-making is also hopelessly inappropriate in 
international gatherings, as in the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference, COP 
21, in Paris, or even in much smaller gatherings like the UN Security Council 
(section 4). 
 
The mathematical flaws of majoritarianism 
 There are, of course, other decision-making voting procedures, which 
are multi-optional.  No complex question, especially any related to global 
warming, should be reduced and thereby distorted (e.g., as in sections 2.11 
and 2.12) to a dichotomy, or even a series of dichotomies.  Instead, debates 
should cater for every relevant proposal to be ‘on the table’ (a computer 
screen, and maybe too a dedicated web-page); final ballot papers should be 
drawn up by a team of independent facilitators; and decisions or ratifications 
should be taken in multi-option ballots. 
 Consider, then, a scenario in which 28 voters have the preferences 
shown in Table I.  These may be analysed by a number of different voting 
procedures.  Now an initial glance would suggest that option A is very 
divisive; it is, after all, the 1st preference of 7 voters but the 7th of 11, while 
10 voters give it no preference at all!   Option G is not much better, the 1st of 
6, but the 6th of 7 and the 5th of 5.  Of the others, option B gets a mixed 
reception, but something from everybody; support for options C is also 
ambivalent; so maybe D, E or F best represents the collective will. 
Table I   A Voters’ Profile   
 Number of voters 
Preferences 7 5 3 1 2 2 2 6 
1st A B C D E F F G 
2nd B D D C C D E E 
3rd F E F B B E D F 
4th D C E - - C C D 
5th E G B - - B B C 
6th G F - - - - - B 
7th - A - - - - - A 
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 Consider, now, seven different analyses under plurality voting; the 
two-round system, TRS; the alternative vote, AV;11 approval voting; a Borda 
count, BC; the modified Borda count, MBC; and the Condorcet rule. 
 
Plurality voting 
 In plurality voting, only the voters’ 1st preferences are taken into 
account.  So the score is A-7, G-6, B-5, F-4, C-3, E-2, D-1, and the winner is 
A. 
 
trs 
 If no one option gains a majority, a second round majority vote can 
be held between the two leading options from the first plurality vote.  So 
that’s a contest between A-7 and G-6, which (if everyone’s preferences stay 
the same) gives A-7, G-11, so G is now the most popular. 
 
av 
 AV is a series of plurality votes, the least popular option being 
eliminated at each stage and its votes transferred in accordance with its 
supporters’ 2nd and subsequent preferences, until one option gains a majority 
(or wins by default).  Stage (i), then, is A-7, G-6, B-5, F-4, C-3, E-2, D-1.  
So D is out, and its vote goes to C: A-7, G-6, B-5, F-4, C-4, E-2.  That’s the 
end of E so, stage (iii), E’s votes also go to C: A-7, G-6, B-5, F-4, C-6.  
Next, F’s votes go (not to D or E, both of which are out of contention), but 
to C, so it’s now A-7, G-6, B-5, C-10.   Finally, in stage (v), B’s 5 votes go 
to C as well for scores of A-7, G-6, C-15, so that’s an absolute majority for 
C. 
 
Approval voting 
 In approval voting, every preference cast is regarded as an ‘approval’, 
so the scores are B28-E27-D26-F25-C21-A/G18, suggesting B is the most 
popular. 
 
bc 
 In a ballot of n options, a voter may cast m preferences where 
n ≥ m ≥ 1. 
 Points are awarded to (1st, 2nd … penultimate, last) preferences cast 
as per the rule:  
(n, n-1 … 2, 1). 
                                                          
11  Also known as the single transferable vote, STV; as instant run-off voting, IRV, in 
the States; and as preference voting, PV, in Australasia. 
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 This give scores of E130-D129-B125-F118-C93-G71-A60, so E is 
the outcome. 
 
mbc 
 For various reasons (Emerson 2013: 353-8), the above BC is not what 
Jean-Charles de Borda had actually proposed (Saari 2008: 197).  In effect, he 
advocated what is now called an MBC in which, in contrast to the BC, points 
are awarded as per the rule:  
(m, m-1 … 2, 1). 
 This gives scores of D104-E101-F97-B92-C67-G64-A53, so D best 
represents the consensus. 
 
The Condorcet rule 
 A comparison of the pairings according to the Condorcet rule gives a 
ranking of F5-D4.5-E4-B3.5-C3-G1-A0, so the Condorcet winner is F.   
 All of these results are shown in Table II. 
Table II The Social Choices and Social Rankings of Table I’s Voters’ Profile 
Voting 
Procedure 
Social 
choice 
Social ranking Social ranking scores 
Plurality voting A A>G>B>F>C>E>D A7, G6, B5, F4, C3, E2, D1 
TRS G G>A G11, A7     
Approval voting B B>E>D>F>C>A=G B28, E27, D26, F25, C21, 
A/G18 
AV C C>A>G C15, A7, G6 
BC E E>D>B>F>C>G>A E130, D129, B125, F118, C93, 
G71, A64 
MBC D D>E>F>B>C>G>A D104, E101, F97, B92, C67, 
G64, A53 
Condorcet F F>D>E>B>C>G>A F5, D4.5, E4, B3.5, C3, G1, A0 
 
 With this voters’ profile, then, the democratic decision can be either 
A or B or C or D or E or F or G.  It is an extraordinary fact but, because 
voting procedures are so little understood, countless decisions are regarded 
as democratic and true representations of the collective will inappropriately, 
often with horrific consequences, (sections 2.4 – 2.10). 
 
Inclusive decision-making 
 In 2002, the UN Security Council debated Iraq.  The topic could 
hardly have been more serious.  Yet everything was reduced to a dichotomy: 
Resolution 1441, yes or no?  France and Germany, the former a veto power, 
did not like the phrase “serious consequences”.12  Yet they voted in favour.  
                                                          
12  The Security Council “Recalls… that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it 
will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.”  
Article 13. 
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In fact, the vote was unanimous, 15 to nil.  But obviously, from a Franco-
German and maybe other viewpoints, support for that Resolution was not 
unanimous.  That majority vote was a cause of war. 
 If Resolution 1441 as drafted had been option A; if France and 
Germany had proposed alternative wording, even if only for that particular 
clause, that could have been option B; Syria was a temporary member of the 
Council, and might have wanted another variation, option C; and the status 
quo ante, of course, would have been option D.  If such had been the 
scenario, the Council could have held a preference vote on the four options 
and, if nothing else, gained a much more accurate assessment of the 
Council’s consensus.  It might also have prevented that war and many of the 
horrible events which have followed the 2003 invasion. 
 A consensus cannot best be identified by majority voting, for the 
latter measures the very opposite – so many ‘for’ and so many ‘against – the 
degree of dissent.  In inclusive decision-making, the procedure allows all 
concerned, not only to cast their preferences on the options listed after the 
debate, but also to participate during the debate in choosing those options.  
Accordingly, an independent authority – in a parliament, the Speaker; in a 
public enquiry, the commissioners – should allow all relevant options to be 
‘on the table’ and computer screen, subject only to one proviso, namely, that 
the given proposal complies with an international norm like the UN Charter 
on Human Rights. 
 The outcome should be that option which gains the highest level of 
overall support as measured by its consensus coefficient (Emerson 2007: 
161), the option’s MBC score divided by the maximum possible score. 
 
The inclusive nature of an mbc 
 In, say, a seven-option MBC ballot, he who casts just one preference 
exercises just 1 point; she who casts two preferences gives her favourite 2 
points (and her 2nd choice 1 point); he who casts three preferences gives his 
favourite 3 points  (his 2nd choice 2 and his 3rd 1 point); and so on; so she 
who casts all seven preferences gives her favourite 7 points (her 2nd choice 6, 
etc.).  The outcome is the option with the most points. 
 The difference is always 1 point.  A voter’s xth preference, therefore, 
will always get 1 point more than his (x+1)th preference, regardless of 
whether or not he has cast that (x+1)th preference. 
 In this way, the mathematics of the count encourages the voter to cast 
a full ballot; in so doing, he recognises the validity of the other options and 
the aspirations of their proponents.  The MBC is inclusive.   Meanwhile, the 
protagonist will want her option to succeed.  Therefore, she will want all her 
supporters to cast full (or at least nearly full) ballots.  Furthermore, she will 
want her erstwhile (majoritarian) opponents to give her option not a 7th but a 
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higher preference, so it will be worth her while to campaign with all 
members of the electorate.  The MBC is indeed inclusive.    
 
Governance and Power-sharing 
 The MBC is also non-majoritarian.  As shown above, it is more 
accurate – and therefore more democratic – than any binary ballot.  
Therefore, whenever the debate concerns a topic which is complex and/or 
contentious, there can be no further justification for this primitive and 
divisive methodology; and no further justification for majority rule.  Instead, 
power-sharing should be the norm. 
 Accordingly, in any inclusive democracy: 
 The people shall elect any representatives, ideally by a proportional 
Borda methodology, the quota Borda system, QBS. 
 The parliament shall then elect a government, and the appropriate 
methodology is a matrix vote (see below).   
 Parliament shall take all non-urgent decisions on the basis of 
consensus, either verbally or by using an MBC vote.  Forming the final list of 
options shall be the responsibility of the Speaker. 
 If as a result of a Citizens’ Initiative or an Act of Parliament, a 
referendum is to be held, an independent commission shall first determine 
the number and nature of all the options to be listed.  
 
The Matrix Vote 
 In a matrix vote, every member of parliament may vote, in order of 
preference, not only for which MPs they want to be in cabinet, but also for the 
particular portfolio in which they want each of these nominees to serve.  It 
shall first be decided (in an MBC ballot) how many shall be in cabinet, what 
shall be the various functions, and who shall be eligible for election.  
 Consider then the simple example of a seven-member cabinet, in 
which case the appropriate ballot paper could be as shown in Table III. 
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Table III A Matrix Vote Ballot Paper 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each member first chooses, in order of preference, those whom 
he/she wishes to be in cabinet, and these he/she then lists in the shaded 
column, as shown, Ms M, Ms U, and so on.  Next, in the unshaded matrix, 
the member gives a tick to identify the portfolio in which he/she wants each 
of these nominess to serve.  The completed ballot, then, has a full list of 
seven different names, plus seven separate ticks, one in each column and one 
in each row. 
 The count consists of two analyses.  The first is a Quota Borda 
System, QBS,13 count of the preferences cast in the shaded column, so to 
identify the seven most popular candidates.  Then comes an MBC analysis of 
the ticks (or rather points) cast, with appointments based in descending order 
on the candidate/portfolio with the largest matrix MBC scores. 
 In electing a seven-member cabinet, a party with, say, 25 per cent of 
the seats in parliament can expect to get two candidates elected.  
Accordingly, MPs of this party would be well advised to vote for two or at 
most three of their own, but then to vote for other members of other parties.  
Such cross-party voting is a vital element, so this author would argue, of a 
power-sharing polity.  In like manner, such co-operation should be a vital 
part of any international gathering. 
 
                                                          
13  In a QBS count, in stage (i), any single candidate with one quota of 1st preferences is 
deemed elected; in stage (ii) any pair of candidates with two quotas of 1st/2nd preferences are 
both elected; then, in stage (iii), if another pair has a single quota, the one with the higher 
MBC score is elected; and if seats are still to be filled, stage (iv) is based on the candidates’ 
MBC scores. 
 The Cabinet 
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1st  Ms 
M 
   ✓    
2nd  Ms U     ✓   
3rd  Mr P       ✓ 
4th  Mr T  ✓      
5th  Mr R ✓       
6th  Ms H   ✓     
7th  Ms B      ✓  
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Facilitating and implementing international agreements 
 Consensus voting – the MBC in decision-making, QBS in elections, 
and the matrix vote in delegations – could be an essential feature in all 
multilateral forums.  The matrix vote could be used for the election of 
chairpersons, spokespersons, representatives or whomsoever, and the MBC 
could be used to resolve and/or ratify all matters of policy. 
 The 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference ended in 
disarray.  This was partly because the final agreement, the Copenhagen 
Accord, was supposed to be adopted ‘in consensus’ – a term which is usually 
taken to mean unanimously.  The very methodology is part of the problem, 
giving as it does each and every country the power of veto. 
 The Accord was drafted by only five countries – admittedly, all very 
big ones – and in the final stages, it failed to be adopted; instead, it was only 
‘noted’.  Granted, considerable energy had been expended in trying to ensure 
that the conference would come to a successful conclusion.  183 countries 
had been represented in Bonn, for example, six months earlier, but there was 
and still is a tendency which suggests the final draft should be approved 
unanimously.  This of course implies that any country can exercise a veto or, 
at the very least, fail to ratify such an agreement. 
 The difficulties were, of course, numerous.  There again, coming to 
an agreement on the exact figure for the proposed reduction in CO2 
emissions, for example – proposals varied from -40 to +5 oC – could have 
been more efficiently expedited by MBC. 
 The Paris conference, COP21,14 was rather more successful, not least 
because of the tactic by which, rather than asking all countries to agree to 
one given set of criteria for action for everyone, each was asked to devise its 
own plans for how it would comply, admittedly with the general agreement 
of keeping any global temperature rise to a maximum of 2oC.  
 The agreement was not as good as it might have been, however, and 
the most glaring exceptions related to aviation and shipping.  Another feature 
absent from Paris concerned actions to be undertaken in the event that any 
one country fails to comply with its provisions.  It would of course be quite 
difficult to persuade certain countries to agree to a treaty under the terms of 
which they could later be sanctioned.  Nevertheless, if the world continues to 
give individual nation states total sovereignty over all of their activities, 
future generations may be confronted by the most horrible of problems.   
 Collective governance must cater for the situation in which those 
members of the human family who do not comply with everyone’s collective 
decisions must accept their individual responsibilities.  Sadly, society is 
                                                          
14  The author participated in the Paris demonstration on the Champ-de-Mars on 
12.12.2015. 
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confronted by a conundrum, for just as the veto powers in the UN Security 
Council have a veto on any proposals to reform that veto, so too, as it stands 
at the moment, individual countries may veto collective decisions with 
impunity.   
 The first step, therefore, is to dismiss the notion that a majority vote 
can accurately identify the “will of the people.”  It cannot.  Logically, as 
noted above, it is impossible. In its place, the UN and others should practice a 
more inclusive methodology, but first they should endeavor to define more 
precisely what they mean by the term “democratic rights”; alas, at the 
moment, their efforts have been all too glib.15  A more comprehensive 
charter would include sections on decision-making and on governance.   
 Now no voting system is perfect.  As shown (section 4), however, 
some decision-making systems are at best capricious, others are so-so, and a 
few are robust, accurate and fair.  Not least because they are the only voting 
procedures that take all preferences cast by all voters into account, both the 
MBC and Condorcet are more exact.  Indeed, with many voters’ profiles, the 
MBC social choice is the same as the Condorcet social choice, and maybe the 
two social rankings coincide as well.  Such was the case in Table II, where 
the MBC and Condorcet social rankings were almost the same, and both in 
total contrast to that of plurality voting.   
 Accordingly, on really serious topics as in conferences on global 
warming, ballots should indeed be multi-optional and counts should be 
conducted by both an MBC and a Condorcet count; then, if the social choice 
from both is the same, and if this outcome gains a sufficiently high 
consensus coefficient, that outcome can be regarded as the will of all 
concerned – the “will of the people” – with a very high degree of confidence 
 
Conclusion 
 The decision-making methodology is key.  In UN conferences, in the 
UN Security Council, in parliaments and councils everywhere, and definitely 
in referendums, questions on complex problems should not be reduced to 
simple dichotomies, ‘yes-or-no?’  This is partly because some people may be 
tempted to vote ‘no’ for reasons unrelated to the motion on the ballot paper, 
(section 2.12). 
                                                          
15  Article 21 of the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights: 
(i) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely elected representatives. 
(ii) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall 
be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be held by secret vote or by 
equivalent free voting procedures. 
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 Logically, the will of any given electorate can only be identified if 
each of the voters first states his or her own individual wills.  In both the 
UK’s Brexit vote and in Italy’s referendum, many voters stated what they did 
not want, so both of those ballots had inaccurate outcomes. 
 In the US and in Europe, populism is getting stronger.  Granted, there 
are many people who are disgruntled with the present order.  If, however, 
majority voting remains the norm, there is the danger that there will be a 
proliferation of referendums in the EU and elsewhere and that, almost 
regardless of the question, the outcome in many will be ‘no’.  So the EU may 
collapse.  So countries might do the same.  So the prospects of any combined 
effort to solve the problems of global warming will be reduced. 
 Meanwhile, abroad, if majority voting remains unchallenged, there is 
the danger that the Kurds will never be invited to join in the governance of 
Turkey; that the problems of Israel and Palestine will forever fester, (section 
2.9); that conflicts will continue to emerge on sectarian lines, not least in the 
Middle East; that in countries like China, many may wish certain parts of 
that jurisdiction to opt out but, in so doing, they might risk appalling 
violence in other parts, (section 2.10); and that some countries in Africa may 
also fall apart, on religious and/or tribal lines. 
 Meanwhile, internationally, in the inevitable event of even more 
serious problems caused by climate change, it will be increasingly difficult to 
come to worthwhile and effective agreements to effectively tackle these 
problems, for as long as people believe in the rights of a majority to rule 
and/or those of a minority to veto.  Problems could be solved more readily if 
resort were made to multi-option, preferential voting.  Decision-making is, 
yes, key.  The problem is so complex, what with rising sea-levels, de-
forestation, over-population, increasing species loss and nuclear 
proliferation, but an understanding of decision-making will be yet another 
part of the holistic solution. 
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